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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs Lon S. Nield and Patricia L. Nield ("Nields") 
and V. Mark Peterson and Nancy L. Peterson ("Petersons") initiated 
this action against petitioners Rone, Gregg and Bieber, seeking to 
permanently enjoin the efforts of Rone, Gregg and Bieber to 
foreclose on the Nield and Peterson homes pursuant to certain 
purported judgment liens. Rone, Gregg and Bieber counterclaimed, 
seeking enforcement of their purported judgment liens. Rone, Gregg 
and Bieber also filed a third-party complaint asserting various 
claims against additional parties. 
The trial court entered partial summary judgment in favor 
of the Nields and Petersons in August, 1989, permanently enjoining 
Rone, Gregg and Bieber from attempts to foreclose on the Nield and 
Peterson homes. This ruling was certified as a final judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, This 
judgment was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals, under its Rule 
31 calendar, on January 28, 1991. Petitioners thereupon filed this 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
The relevant facts underlying this litigation are as 
follows: 
In 1983, Rone, Gregg and Bieber each initiated actions 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of 
Utah, against Fred and Kurt Vreeken ("Vreekens") and a number of 
entities alleged to be fictitious names or sole proprietorships of 
the Vreekens. In each case, Rone, Gregg and Bieber alleged that 
the Vreekens had defrauded Rone, Gregg and Bieber of investments 
made with the Vreekens. In each case, Rone, Gregg and Bieber 
entered default judgment against several of the entities named as 
defendants, but no judgment has ever been entered as to the 
remaining defendants in any of the three actions, [See R. 256-
57, 273-74, and 295-96.] 
On May 1, 1984, Judge Ballif of the Fourth District Court 
ruled that Rone had not properly effected service of process on the 
defendants in Rone's action. Thus, Rone's default judgment in that 
action was invalid. [R. 259-64.] Judge Ballif»s ruling was 
affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals in May, 1988, in 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken. 754 P. 2d 960 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied 765 P.2d 1278 (1988)1. 
On September 15, 1987, three years after Judge Ballif 
had held Rone's default judgment to be invalid, Rone, Gregg and 
Bieber caused the clerk of the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County, Utah, to issue executions under the Rone, Gregg and 
Bieber judgments against, among other things, the homes of the 
Nields and the Petersons. [R. 353-58.] Neither the Nields nor the 
Petersons had been named as parties to the lawsuits initiated 
against the Vreekens by Rone, Gregg and Bieber. The Nields and 
Petersons are not named as judgment debtors in the Rone, Gregg and 
Bieber judgments. Utah County records do not reflect that the 
Vreekens have ever held an interest in the Nield and Peterson 
properties, nor do Utah County records show that any of the parties 
1
 Petitioners have attached to their brief relevant orders and 
rulings as required by Rule 49(a) (10) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The Nields and Petersons, therefore, have not 
duplicated that effort. Petitioners have, however, included only 
a partial copy of the Demetropoulos v. Vreeken opinion in their 
Appendix. The full text of that decision is set forth in the 
Appendix to this brief. 
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named in the Rone, Gregg and Bieber lawsuits have ever held an 
interest in the Nield and Peterson properties, [R. 317-22.] 
Indeed, at the initiation of Rone's lawsuit, Rone's attorney 
submitted an affidavit to the court in support of Rone's petition 
for a pre-judgment writ of attachment. In this affidavit, Rone's 
attorney attested that his examination of Utah County records 
revealed that none of the individuals or entities named as 
defendants in Rone's action owned any real property in Utah County. 
[R. 432-37.] Until the Utah County Sheriff posted notices of a 
sheriff's sale on the doors to their homes, the Nields and 
Petersons had no knowledge of the Vreekens' business dealings or 
the Rone, Gregg and Bieber judgments. [R. 325-27; 349-51.] 
In seeking to enjoin Rone, Gregg and Bieber from 
foreclosing upon their homes, the Nields and Petersons argued that: 
(1) the Rone, Gregg and Bieber judgments were not valid because 
Rone, Gregg and Bieber failed to effect service of process as 
required under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) the Rone, 
Gregg and Bieber judgments were not final judgments and, therefore, 
gave rise to no judgment liens against any real property, including 
the homes of the Nields and Petersons. When Rone, Gregg and Bieber 
appealed the summary judgment against them to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, the Nields and Petersons moved the Court of Appeals to 
award them fees and costs incurred in the appeal because the Rone, 
Gregg and Bieber appeal was frivolous. The Utah Court of Appeals 




In their Brief of Respondents to the Court of Appeals, 
the Nields and Petersons analyzed in detail the reasons why the 
district court properly granted summary judgment in their favor. 
That brief, likewise, contains a detailed stateiaent of the reasons 
why an award of costs of fees in favor of the Nields and Petersons 
was appropriate. The Nields and Petersons will not, therefore, 
repeat that analysis, but instead will provide this Court with only 
a brief summary of these reasons and urge the Court to consult 
respondents1 brief in the court below if the Court desires a fuller 
analysis of the issues. 
I. ISSUES SURROUNDING THE VREEKENS• USE OF 
PSEUDONYMS ARE IRRELEVANT TO THIS LITIGATION. 
Throughout this litigation, Rone, Gregg and Bieber have 
made a variety of arguments regarding the Vreekens' use of 
pseudonyms in their business dealings. [Brief of Petitioner, at 
7-11, 15-17.] The point of those arguments has rarely been clear. 
Whether the Vreekens used a variety of false identities in order 
to defraud investors is simply irrelevant to the question of 
whether Rone, Gregg and Bieber have secured valid and final 
judgments against anyone that would allow them to execute on 
property allegedly owned by the Vreekens. Certainly, any relevant 
issues relating to the Vreekens1 use of false identities should be 
raised by Rone, Gregg and Bieber in litigcition against the 
Vreekens, rather than in litigation against innocent third parties 
such as the Nields and Petersons. However, petitioners have never 
bothered to secure judgments against the Vreekens. 
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II. THE RONE, GREGG AND BIEBER JUDGMENTS 
ARE NOT VALID JUDGMENTS. 
The Rone judgment was declared invalid by Judge Ballif 
of the Fourth District in 1984, a judgment that was affirmed by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken. 754 P.2d 960 
(Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278, (1988). Thus, this 
state's highest courts have already ruled that the Rone judgment 
is invalid. It is simply incredible that in defiance of these 
rulings, Rone has attempted to enforce that judgment by foreclosing 
on the homes of innocent third parties and continues to demand 
relitigation on this issue. [Brief of Petitioner, at 11.] 
The reasons why service of process was defective in the 
Rone case have been described in detail in the Court of Appeals' 
opinion in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken. Exactly the same factual 
defects exist with respect to service of process in the Gregg and 
Bieber cases. The same constable effected service of process in 
each case, and in each case, the constable determined that service 
would be made on Keith or Chris Vreeken as agents for the entities 
named in the complaints, based on the constable's guess that Keith 
and Chris Vreeken were somehow connected with Fred Vreeken's 
business. [R. 1201-25.] A judgment, final after appeal, has been 
rendered in the Rone case that the constable's guess that an 
individual was somehow involved in a business is insufficient to 
establish that individual as a proper agent for service of process. 
Exactly the same record exists regarding service of process in the 
Gregg and Bieber actions. 
-5-
In sum, the Utah Court of Appeals committed no error that 
would call for this Court's review in affirming that service of 
process was not effectively made in any of the Rone, Gregg or 
Bieber lawsuits and that Rone, Gregg and Bieber do not, therefore, 
have valid judgments that would support their execution efforts. 
III. THE RONE, GREGG AND BIEBER JUDGMENTS 
ARE NOT FINAL JUDGMENTS. 
Under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
a judgment is not final unless it resolves all claims against all 
parties, unless a judgment against less than all parties or as to 
less than all claims has been certified as final pursuant to Rule 
54(b). Kennedy v. New Era Industries, Inc.. 600 P.2d 534, 536-37 
(Utah 1979). It is undisputed that the Rone, Gregg and Bieber 
default judgments were judgments entered as to less than all 
parties and that those judgments were not certified pursuant to 
Rule 54(b). 
Courts have uniformly held that a judgment as to less 
than all claims or all parties that has not been certified as final 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), does not permit execution on the judgment 
and does not give rise to a judgment lien. Bank of Lincolnwood v. 
Federal Leasing. Inc.. 622 F.2d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 1980); Redding 
& Co. v. Russwine Construction Corp., 417 F.2d 721, 727 (D.C. Cir. 
1969); Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Service. Inc.. 590 F. Supp. 171, 
176 (E.D. La. 1984); City of Salina v. Star B. Inc.. 11 Kan. App. 
2d 639, 731 P.2d 1290, 1294, aff'd, 739 P.2d 933 (Kan. 1987); 
Arizona Farmers Prod. Credit Ass'n. v. Stewart Title & Trust of 
Tucson. 24 Ariz. App. 5, 535 P.2d 33, 35 (1975). Petitioners have 
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presented no contrary authority that would suggest that a judgment 
that does not satisfy the finality requirements of Rule 54(b) is 
enforceable. Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no error in 
affirming that the Rone, Gregg and Bieber judgments are not final 
judgments and gave rise to no judgment liens that would allow Rone, 
Gregg and Bieber to execute against the Nield and Peterson homes. 
IV. THE RONE, GREGG AND BIEBER APPEAL REMAINS FRIVOLOUS 
AND WARRANTS A CONTINUED IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS. 
The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the Rone, Gregg 
and Bieber appeal was so lacking in merit that Rone, Gregg and 
Bieber, rather than the Nields and Petersons, should bear the 
expenses incurred by the Nields and Petersons in the appeal. In 
their appeal to this Court, Rone, Gregg and Bieber accuse the Court 
of Appeals panel with a "nonchalant" attitude toward the appeal and 
"ignorance" of the briefs. [Brief of Petitioner, at 32-33.] These 
charges are unsubstantiated, and improperly demean both the Court 
and counsel. Rone, Gregg and Bieber point to no specifics in which 
they believe the Court of Appeals erred in awarding fees and costs. 
The brief summary of arguments provided above hopefully 
demonstrates that the positions adopted by Rone, Gregg and Bieber 
in this litigation are without legal merit. Indeed, the attempt 
of Rone to collect a judgment from innocent third parties in 
defiance of the fact that the courts of this state have declared 
his judgment to be invalid constitutes the clearest possible abuse 
of the judicial system. 
The appeal of Rone, Gregg and Bieber to the Utah Court 
of Appeals was without merit, the Utah Court of Appeals so held 
-7-
and, therefore, awarded the Nields and Petersons costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in that appeal. The case of Rone, Gregg 
and Bieber has gained no merit in being pressed one more level to 
an appeal before this Court. The Nields and Petersons, therefore, 
respectfully move this Court to deny Rone's, Gregg's and Bieber's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and to award the Nields and 
Petersons their costs and attorney's fees incurred in preparing 
this reply brief on the ground that the Rone, Gregg and Bieber 
appeal continues to be without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The Nields and Petersons respectfully request this Court 
to deny Rone's, Gregg's and Bieber's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. The ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals that the Rone, 
Gregg and Bieber judgments are not valid or final and can, 
therefore, support no judgment liens against the Nield and Peterson 
homes was clearly correct. The merits of the case are so clear 
that the Court of Appeals likewise correctly concluded that an 
imposition of sanctions under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure was appropriate. Finally, the Nields and 
Petersons respectfully move this Court to confirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals by awarding further sanctions under Rule 33 
to reimburse the Nields and Petersons for their fees and costs 
incurred in the preparation of this brief. 
-8-
4* RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I " day of May, 1991. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
^m.JLjl Lzfcz 
MICHAEL M. LATER 
Attorneys for Respondents 
-9-
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Dale and Kathy 
DEMETROPOULOS, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Fred VREEKEN, et alM Defendants. 
Deseret Bank, Garnishee. 
BJ. RONE, Plaintiff in Intervention 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Dale and Kathy DEMETROPOULOS, 
Defendants in Intervention and 
Respondents. 
No. 860031-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 11, 1988. 
Creditors disputed relative priority of 
their prejudgment writs of attachment and 
garnishment The Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, George F. Ballif, J., held for 
first creditor, and appeal was taken. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that even 
if judgment creditors1 prejudgment writ of 
attachment was invalid, their postjudgment 
writ of garnishment had priority over sec-
ond creditor's prejudgment writ of garnish-
ment where second creditor's judgment 
against debtors was invalid for lack of jur-
isdiction due to insufficiency of service of 
process. 
Affirmed* 
Jackson, J., concurred and filed opin-
ion* 
1. Appeal and Error * W t 
Court of Appeals would reach merits 
of appeal notwithstanding inadequacies of 
appellants brief. Court of Appeals Rule 
24(k). 
1. "Inadequate sppellate briefs whkh do not sig-
nificantly assist the Court in disposing of the 
case before it have proven to be s significant 
problem. In order to alleviate this concent this 
Rule clearly specifies the required contents and 
order of each brief." Utah ILAppJ1. 24 advisory 
committee note. Sm Note 3, infra. 
2. "It may be said that a brief is as effective as it 
is helpful in deciding the question or questions 
2. Garnishment *=»107 
Even if judgment creditors' p ^ 
ment writ of attachment was invalid th '" 
postjudgment writ of garnishment h^ d nl 
ority over second creditor's prejudgm^ 
writ of garnishment for second creditor* 
judgment against debtors was invalid to 
lack of jurisdiction due to insufficiency
 0f 
service of process; second creditor's pr* 
judgment writ of garnishment was provi. 
sional remedy which did not itself entitle 
second creditor to provisionally garnished 
property. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 64D(a)(i) 
George M. McCune, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant, Rone. 
Robert H. Wilde, Murray, for respon-
dent, Demetropoulo8 Cook & Wilde. 




This case involves a dispute over the 
validity of respondents1 prejudgment writ 
of attachment and the priority of appel-
lant's prejudgment writ of garnishment 
Despite the inadequacy of appellant's brief, 




While numerous issues are raised on ap-
peal, appellant's brief has not been of much 
help to the court in disposing of the esse 
before it1 The purpose of a brief is to 
enlighten the court and elucidate the issues 
rather than confuse the court and obscure 
the issues.1 In this respect, one court has 
presented. Hence, the crucial importance of 
properly phrasing or stating the question or 
issue raised on the appeal cannot be overempha-
sized. By a proper presentation of pertinent 
authority, counsel should demonstrate and per-
suade the court that the answer submitted in the 
brief is warranted if not absolutely required by 
the governing principles of law." Re, Effvm* 
Utah 961 DEMETROPOULOS v. VREEKEN 
Cite a* 734 ?2d 9*0 (UuJiApp. 198S) 
observed that "p]f the court is not supplied ment of facts is little more than a cat-
with the proper tools to decide cases, then alogue of each pleading and paper generat-
exjemely valuable time, already severely ed by the parties or the court, regardless of 
rationed, must be diverted from substan- how inconsequential it might be, and a* 
Uve work mto ess productive tasks.
 cordingly the statement is burdened w£h 
Kushner v. Wxnterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 minuti* Th* *t*t*m*„f ^ ***. . 
F2d 404 407 (3d f ir 1<HW» minuaa. The statement of facts contains 
F.2d 404, 407 (3d Cir.1980). unhelpful citations to the thousand-plus 
Counsel should be aware that appellate page record, such as "See pleading entitled 
courts are beginning to overcome their Pre-judgment Writ of Garnishment with trepidation about dismissing appeals and 
imposing sanctions for failure to comply 
with these procedures. For example, the 
court in Kushner, while acknowledging the 
"institutional" and "precedential" impact 
of its decision, found that counsel's "refus-
al, failure or unwillingness to master [the 
court's] procedures" necessarily required 
dismissal of the appeal and imposition of 
sanctions for failure to file an appendix in 
conformity with court rules. Id. at 407. 
More recently, this court chose to disregard 
an inadequate brief and premised its af-
firmance, in part, on the failure of the brief 
to comply with our rules. Koulis v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah 
CtApp.1987). 
The Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
set forth the general requirements to be 
observed by litigants bringing appeals in 
this court Rule 24(k)s requires that all 
briefs "be concise, presented with accura-
cy, logically arranged with proper head-
ings, and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters/9 While 
appellant's brief is free from "scandalous 
matters/' it is not concise, logically ar-
ranged, or free from burdensome material. 
Appellant's brief begins with a laborious, 
ten-page Statement of Facts. The state-
Legal Writing and the AppaUat* Brief, Case 4 
Comment, July-Aug. 1984, at 9, 18. 
3. Although our citations are to Rule 24 of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, effective 
January 13, 1987, that rule does not differ from 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, effective January 1.1985. While it is true 
that appellant's brief was filed a few weeks 
before the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
went into effect, it is also true that the problems 
inherent in the transition from the prior rules to 
the new appellate rules were anticipated It 
was intended that "unless there is substantial 
prejudice in a particular case which results 
from the application of or compliance with 
these Rules, the Rules shall govern as of the 
answers to interrogatories dated April 25, 
1983, in the court file" and "See entire 
court file, 4- R169." Confusion is engen-
dered in this multiparty case by inconsist-
ent references to the parties—sometimes 
by their names, sometimes by their desig-
nation at trial, and sometimes by their des-
ignation on appeal See R.Utah CtApp. 
24(d). 
The substance of appellant's first of nine 
points, mercifully reduced from some twen-
ty identified in his docketing statement, is 
obscured within the 135 words it takes to 
make it Point I, by no means unique 
among appellant's points, is captioned as 
follows: 
DEMETROPOULOS' PRE-JUDGMENT 
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT AND PRO-
CEEDINGS THEREON WERE SUB-
STANTIVELY INCORRECT AND 
VOID BECAUSE THE WRIT AND 
PROCEEDINGS THEREON WERE UN-
AMENDABLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE 
A RETURN AND INVENTORY WAS 
NOT FILED FOR 7 MONTHS INSTEAD 
OF WITHIN 20 DAYS AS REQUIRED 
BY RULE 64Cfli), A DETAILED IN-
VENTORY WAS NOT FILED AS RE-
QUIRED BY RULE 64Qh), THE SERV-
effective date, all appellate procedure . . . in-
cluding cases presently in process." Utah 
ILAppJ>., introductory note of Supreme Court 
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. While the new rules were not effec-
tive until January 1985, they were prepared in 
draft form and circulated among the bar for 
comment and information well in advance of 
their effective date. 
We acknowledge that under former Utah 
R.Civ.P. 75<p), which was in effect when appel-
lant's brief was filed,, the requirements for brief-
ing were phrased somewhat differently. None-
theless, even under rhat rule appellant's brief is 
deficient 
962 Utah 754 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ING OFFICER FAILED TO ASK FOR A 
MEMORANDUM OF CREDITS AT-
TACHED AS REQUIRED BY RULE 
64C(h), NO DEFENDANTS WERE 
SERVED WITH PLEADINGS WITHIN 
10 DAYS OF ISSUANCE OF THE PRE-
JUDGMENT ATTACHMENT IN A 
WAY ALLOWED BY RULE 4, AND 
THE WRIT THEREFORE AUTOMATI-
CALLY DIED A JUDICIAL DEATH AT 
THE END OF ITS 10-DAY LIFE, AND 
GARNISHMENT UNDER RULE 64D 
WAS THE APPROPRIATE WRIT TO 
ISSUE TO LIEN PROPERTY IN THE 
HANDS OF THIRD PARTIES RATHER 
THAN ATTACHMENT UNDER RULE 
64C. 
When Point I is dissected, it obviously con-
cerns several issues. The argument under 
Point I is a disjointed presentation of ab-
stract legal doctrines pertaining to garnish-
ment and attachment Cases are quoted 
and checklists from legal encyclopedias 
provided, with scant attention given to the 
facts of the instant matter and no actual 
analysis of those facts in light of the legal 
authorities excerpted Appellant invites us 
to draw what he apparently regards as 
obvious conclusions, ending the argument 
under Point I with: "In the instant case, 
the Pre-judgment Writ of Attachment of 
Respondents can not have survived all of 
the above defects. The cites to the record 
made in the Statement of Facts above 
clearly shows that" Difficulty in follow-
ing the argument is compounded by the 
lack of a summary of arguments as re-
quired by Rule 24(aX8).4 
4. Rule 24<»XS), Rules of the Utah Court of Ap* 
peals, requires the brief of appellant to contain 
"[a] summary of arguments. The summary of 
arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a sue-
cinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief . It shall not be a 
mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged* 
5. Judge Re has noted in this respect that I t is 
counsel's responsibility to point out the error 
and to demonstrate that it was reversible be-
cause it affected the substantial rights of the 
appellant" Re, Effective Legal Writing and tha 
Appellate Brief, Case and Comment, Juiy-Aug. 
1984, at 9, 18. 
We concede that not every brief ffled • 
in strict compliance with our rules. NorH 
every brief we see, any more than every 
opinion we write, a masterpiece of Ieg2 
writing. Ordinarily, however, the briefs do 
enable us to understand, with varying de-
grees of effort, what particular errors were 
allegedly made, where in the record those 
errors can be found, and why, under applj. 
cable authorities, those errors are material 
ones necessitating reversal or other relief.1 
While appellant's task has no doubt been 
complicated by the convoluted procedural 
posture of the case, appellant's brief fails 
to give us much help in finding the keys to 
understanding it1 
[1] Under Rule 24(k), briefs which are 
not in compliance with the requirements of 
our rule or are otherwise inadequate may 
be disregarded or stricken by the court and 
attorney fees can be imposed. Sympa-
thetic to the Kushner court's view that 
"[w]e can no longer afford the effort and 
time to prepare counsels' case and to sup-
ply counsels' record deficiencies," 620 F.2d 
at 407 (quoting United States v. Somen, 
562 F.2d 108, 115 (3d Cir.1977)), when this 
time can be "better spent in considering 
the merits of cases that are presented to us 
in proper form," 620 F.2d at 407, we have 
considered dealing with the brief in one of 
the ways provided in Rule 24(k). While we 
can be expected to become less timid in this 
regard over time—and as we recognize 
that a brief which fails to do its job is, in a 
sense, its own sanction—we decline to im-
pose Rule 24(k) sanctions in this case and 
turn to the merits of the appeaL7 
6. Our confusion might have been alleviated 
through oral argument, but no request was 
made pursuant to ILUtah CtApp. 29(b) and so 
argument held Nor did appellant submit a 
reply brief which might also have clarified the 
issues* 
7. This approach is not inconsistent with this 
court's disposition of Koulis v. Standard Oil Co, 
746 PJd 1182 (Utah <XApp.l9S7). In KouUs, * 
unanimous panel found appellant's brief inade-
quate under Rule 24 and therefore determined 
to "sua sponte disregard Koulis' brief on appeaL 
We also assume the correctness of the judgment 
below, and find that Katherine Koulis ... has 
failed to come forward with any legally cogniza-
ble reason to excuse her delayed discovery of 
MERITS OF APPEAL 
Appellant has set forth various "facts" 
in his brief. He has not, however, "mar-
shalOed] all the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings and then demon-
DEMETROPOULOS v. VREEKEN 
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lant's initial foray into the action was sub-
sequently nullified because of his failure to 
comply with Utah R.Civ.P. 24<c) following 
issuance of the writ of mandamus. Vari-
ous papers filed by him were stricken by 
stratefd] that even viewing it in the light court order because he had not first filed « 
most favorable to the court below, the evi- complaint in intervention and paid the nee" 
dence is insufficient to support the find- essary filing fee. These oversights were 
ings." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, "we 
take as our starting point the trial court's 
findings8 and not [appellant's] recitation of 
the facts." Id 
Respondents Dale and Kathy Demotropo-
lous filed their action against various de-
fendants and obtained a prejudgment writ 
of attachment The same was served on 
Deseret Bank on April 12, 1983, as Deseret 
Bank held certain accounts in the names of 
some of the defendants. Appellant BJ. 
Rone, a creditor of some or all of these 
same defendants, then filed his own civil 
action and obtained a prejudgment writ of 
garnishment He served the bank eleven 
days later. Before respondents' writ ex-
pired, it was extended twice, the second 
time indefinitely, "pending a request by the 
Defendants to have the matter heard" 
Respondents obtained judgment by default 
against defendants and, in execution of the 
judgment, promptly served the bank with a 
post-judgment writ of garnishment Ap-
pellant obtained a default judgment in the 
action he filed a few weeks later. 
Appellant intervened in the action re-
spondents filed to assert his entitlement to 
the accounts*9 Intervention was denied by 
the district court; but was subsequently 
permitted pursuant to a writ of mandamus 
issued by the Utah Supreme Court Appel-
the alleged fraud19 UL at 1185. Nonetheless, 
the panel was apparently not comfortable in 
premising its affirmance solely on that ground 
and went on to conclude that affirmance was 
also warranted on statute of limitation grounds. 
Id at 1185-86. 
8. We do so only insofar as the findings of fact, 
found both in the court's memorandum deci-
sion and its formal "Findings of Fact," are really 
that Some of the "facts" set forth in the find-
ings, prepared by respondents' counsel are ac-
tually conclusions of law or else so broadly 
phrased as to be unhelpful. Finding #3, for 
example, reads as follows: That the Plaintiffs' 
Prejudgment Writ of Attachment was substan-
ultimately corrected. The ancillary pro-
ceeding which was begun with appellant's 
complaint in intervention ultimately culmi-
nated in a judgment dismissing that com-
plaint. It is from that judgment that appel-
lant Rone appeals. 
[2] Appellant claims priority to the ac-
counts in question due to various alleged 
deficiencies in connection with respondents' 
prejudgment writ of attachment Respon-
dents strive to demonstrate that their pre-
judgment writ was proper in every material 
respect, but also attack the validity of ap-
pellant's prejudgment writ of garnishment 
and his default judgment Their basic posi-
tion is that even if their prejudgment writ 
was flawed, appellant's has come to have 
no force or effect, leaving respondents' 
post-judgment writ of garnishment the 
first, clearly valid levy on the accounts held 
by Deseret Bank. 
The trial court's findings support the 
conclusion that apipellanfs prejudgment 
writ of garnishment does not have prece-
dence over respondents' post-judgment writ 
of garnishment, making it unnecessary for 
us to decide whether respondents' prejudg-
ment writ of attachment was valid 
Appellant purported to serve the defend-
ants he named in hiii action, including the 
tively and procedurally proper and correct in 
relevant respects. 
all 
9. Appellant and respondents were victims of the 
same investment scant It is regrettable that, 
having both succeeded in finding a liquid asset 
of defendants at about the same time, they were 
unable to devise an equitable method of sharing 
the prize rather than engaging in a costly, "win-
ner-take-alT contest Astoundingiy, in view of 
the modest size of the garnished accounts and 
amounts invested, their procedural battles gen-
erated some seven hundred pages in court fil-
ings. 
964 U t a h 754 PACIFIC REPORTER 2d SERIES 
defendants whose accounts were gar-
nished, by service upon one Keith Vreeken, 
who was not himself named as a defend-
ant1* However, the court noted in its 
memorandum decision that "[n]o proof ex-
ists in the record other than the constable's 
guess that Keith Vreeken was the agent of 
or had any managerial control for the busi-
ness entities" whose accounts were seized. 
The court formally found that Keith Vreek-
en was not "an officer, managing agent, 
general agent or any other agent autho-
rized to receive service for any relevant 
Defendant herein nor that he was a clerk, 
cashier, chief clerk [or] person having the 
management, direction or control of any 
property of any such Defendant" There is 
adequate support in the record for this 
finding. The defendants* in question were 
found to be "sole proprietorships/' not cor-
porations, and no assumed name certifi-
cates or filings of any sort had been made 
concerning them. Thus, no public record 
showed that Keith Vreeken was registered 
agent for them or otherwise affiliated with 
them. The bank's representative testified 
that Keith Vreeken was not on the signa-
ture cards for the accounts, although oth-
ers with that same last name apparently 
were.11 
Appellant disputes the finding concern-
ing Keith Vreeken's status, but also con-
tends that any problems with his service of 
process on the defendants a n inconsequen-
tial since service of his prejudgment writ of 
garnishment was duly made on the bank. 
This fact does not save appellant A pre-
judgment writ of garnishment is a provi-
sional remedy only, "available as a means 
10. Appellant named ss defendants Kurt Vreek-
en, an individual doing business under various 
?fmtw%mA names; Fred Vreeken, an individual 
doing business under those same names; "busi-
ness entities" corresponding to Kurt and Fred 
Vreeken's assumed names; John Andrews, Rick 
Ramsey and Jerry Pitts, under various assumed 
names; Financial Development Group, a busi-
ness entity; and "several John Does, whoee 
names are not yet known." The Deseret Bank 
accounts stood in the names under which Kurt 
and Fred Vreeken allegedly did business. 
11. It is worth noting diet one of them, Kurt 
Vreeken, had been served by the constable used 
by appellant on at least one prior occasion. 
of attachment of intangible property 
before judgment, in cases in which a writ 
of attachment is available under Rule 64C " 
Utah R.Civ.P. 64D<aXi). Such a prejudg. 
ment writ merely commands the garnishee 
to retain the property "until further order 
of the court" Utah R.Civ.P. 64D(eXi). 
Only if the plaintiff ultimately obtains a 
valid judgment against the defendant is he 
or she entitled to some or all of the provi-
sionally garnished property.12 See Utah 
R.Civ.P. 64D(j). See also Utah R.CivP 
64C(k). 
In this case, the court properly concluded 
that the default judgment obtained by ap-
pellant in the action he filed was invalid for 
lack of jurisdiction due to the insufficiency 
of service of process on the defendants in 
that action. The provisional remedy of a 
prejudgment writ of garnishment in that 
same action ceased to have any further 
effect upon entry of that "judgment"ll and 
could be properly disregarded by the court 
in determining who was entitled to the 
accounts, leaving respondents entitled to 
the accounts pursuant to their post-judg-
ment writ of garnishment 
One further point raised by appellant 
merits comment Appellant contends that 
the court erred in not granting his post-tri-
al motion to amend the return of service on 
Keith Vreeken. It is suggested that if the 
return were amended, it would demon-
strate that service on the defendants was 
actually proper, meaning appellant's judg-
ment was valid and his prejudgment writ 
entitled to recognition. We are not per-
IX IGlarnishment to enforce a final judgment 
should be distinguished from the provisional 
remedy of garnishment before trial which i* 
aimed at preserving assets of the debtor until s 
final decision can be had on the merits." D. 
Dobbs, R*m«H*t 11 (1973). 
13. As provided in Rule 64A, appellant's prejudg-
ment writ of garnishment recited that it would 
expire in ten days from issuance unless extend-
ed. Utah RXW.P. 64A(3). Defendants did not 
appear at the hearing on whether the writ 
should be continued and, accordingly, by order 
entered at that bearing, the writ was continued 
"in full force and effect during die pendency [of 
appellant's action] or until further order of the 
court" 
STATE v. GRIFFIN 
Cite M 754 P2d 965 (Utah App. 19M) 
suaded. Any error in disallowing the 
amendment was harmless since the con-
stable testified at length concerning the 
circumstances of service on Keith Vreeken. 
Accordingly, all relevant information was 
before the court anyway. Moreover, we 
find it difficult to see how appellant can 
complain in this appeal about a ruling on a 
motion that would have been properly 
raised, if at all, in another action, namely 
the one he brought and in which the return 
was filed. 
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The judgment appealed from is affirmed. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs. 
JACKSON, Judge (concurring): 
By virtue of random case assignment, 
the burden of trying to make sense of the 
appellants' briefs in this case and in Koulis 
v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah 
App.1987), was cast upon me. No other 
judge of this court was honored with that 
dubious distinction. And I admit the likely 
existence of a cumulative effect upon me. 
In both cases, we have proceeded to decide 
the merits of the issues raised, in deference 
only to the parties and not to appellants1 
counsel. Charles Dickens said that one 
member of Parliament had a tolerable com-
mand of sentences with no meaning in 
them. Appellate counsel must prepare and 
submit briefs that are more than mere 
sound effects. The time will most assured-
ly arrive when a panel of this court will be 
constrained to disregard intolerable and un-
acceptable briefs and not reach the merits 
of the case. 
Defendant was convicted on two 
counts of sexual abuse of a child following 
trial in Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Dean E. Conder, J., and he ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., 
held that: (1) defendant did not waive ob-
jections to second statement by stipulating 
to its admission; (2) defendant's first state-
ment was not taken in violation of his right 
to counsel after arguably equivocal state-
ment as to whether he desired assistance of 
counsel; but (3) manner of interrogation 
utilized in taking first statement was so 
egregious and coercive as to require sup-
pression; and (4) defendant did not make 
valid waiver of his rights prior to second 
interview. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
1. Criminal Law ^1044.2(2) 
Defendant was not required to renew 
at trial his motion to suppress in order to 
preserve issue on appeal where there had 
been evidentiary hearing on suppression 
motion before the same judge who presided 
at trial 
2. Criminal Law *»8M 
Defendant did not waive his objections 
to admissibility of his second statement by 
stipulating to its admission in light of his 
pretrial suppression motion, initial objec-
tion at trial and continued assertion of 
statement's inadmissibility throughout tri-
al. 
3. Criminal Law **1153<1) 
Court of Appeals will not disturb trial 
court's determination of suppression mo-
tion unless trial court, was clearly in error. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /*£ day of May, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief in Opposition of Writ 
of Certiorari was served by mailing a copy thereof by United States 
Mail, postage prepaid addressed as follows: 
George M. McCune 
McCUNE, McCUNE & SUZUKI 
5243 Carpel1 Avenue 
P. 0. Box 18044 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Attorney for Petitioners 
-11-
